

INTELLIGENCE STAFF OFFICER COURSE, MAXWELL AIR FORCE BASE, ALABAMA

GENERAL

The Intelligence Staff Officer Course is conducted by the Intelligence Division, Air Command and Staff School, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama. It is a twenty-two week course, conducted twice a year with a quota of 70 students each class. It is at the same level of instruction as the Air Force Field Officer Course, Logistics Staff Officer Course, and Communications Electronics Staff Officer Course. Students spend forty-four hours a week in scheduled activity.

The course is planned for (1) Field grade officers (Majors and Lt. Colonels) with seven or more years active commissioned or promotion list service, and (2) selected civilian employees, GS-11 or higher. TOP SECRET security clearance is required.

The mission of the Intelligence Staff Officer Course is to provide instruction to selected officers and civilian employees in order to develop an appreciation of the command tasks associated with wings and groups and the principal staff tasks (other than intelligence) associated with numbered air forces, air divisions and wings. It seeks further to develop an understanding of the role of the intelligence staff officer on the commander's team at wing level and above, and to develop skills in solving staff problems pertaining to intelligence.

The mission of the course is based on a concept that its principal task is to educate selected Air Force officers, and civilian employees, possessing broad and varied backgrounds and experience, as staff officers for intelligence. The course provides considerable instruction for developing basic staff officer skills and the specialized skills required of Intelligence staff officers. Basic skills instruction is supplemented further by a block of professional background improvement, an appreciation for operations of and planning for the employment of Air Force units. Provision for application is contained in many opportunities created for students to operate in staff situations, either as a group in committees or as individual staff officers. These staff experiences are built around requirements placed on intelligence staff divisions in headquarters ranging from a wing headquarters through Headquarters USAF.

The operation of the course is based on the premise that it is a graduate level type. Students spend approximately 56 per cent of scheduled time in committee work or on individual requirements, solving typical intelligence staff problems including work on current USAF intelligence problems. Continuous effort is made to create opportunities for students to exercise initiative and accept responsibility in the planning and accomplishment of their work.

Individual preparation requirements are as follows: (1) students are required to participate in the presentation of instruction in the field of their experience or specialties; (2) requirements are placed on the student for research designed to contribute to existing thought or knowledge. Specific research tasks are assigned to both individuals and groups. Research reports are edited for distribution throughout the Air Force as appropriate.

The Intelligence Division has a small group of instructors, each possessing broad knowledge and experience rather than limited specialties. The staff viewpoint is utilized in the organization of instruction in that advantage is taken of the facilities and personnel throughout other divisions of the Air Command and Staff School and other organizations of the Air University, such as the Documentary Research Division of the Research Studies Institute and the Human Resources Research Institute. In addition guest speakers from outside the Air University are utilized to a considerable degree for presenting instruction on specialized subjects.

VALUE OF CURRICULUM TO CIA OFFICER

What if any benefits accrue from Agency representation in the Course? On the negative side is the heavy concentration placed on matters of particular interest only to the Air Force. This includes not only the specialized intelligence training and knowledge required of the Air Force intelligence staff officer at wing, group, and major command levels, but also acquaintance with the duties and responsibilities of other staff activities, including Operations, Logistics, Communications, and the Comptroller, and those pertaining to the command function itself. Thus attention is given to Aerial Reconnaissance, Radar Prediction, Mission Analysis and Combat Reports, Electronic Reconnaissance, Air Target Materials, and Intelligence for Tactical Air Operations, and also to such non-intelligence responsibilities as the Comptroller Staff Section, USAF Material Activities, R & D in the USAF, and the Tactical Air Control System.

Much of this is probably foreign to the average officer representing the CIA and it is difficult for him either to acquire the necessary background common to his fellow Air Force students or to see in it any particular relevance to the Agency mission.

With this necessary limitation (presumably affecting CIA attendance in other service schools as well), much positive benefit can, nevertheless, be derived. Of more than a little significance is the understanding a CIA student acquires of the mission, techniques, operational problems, aspirations, and jealousies of the USAF intelligence organization. He learns not only of the problems at the level of the wing intelligence officer in Korea, but of those of the Reconnaissance Technical Squadron, Long Range Bombardment Command, Air Attache, Air Technical Intelligence Center, AF Security Service, Air Defense Command, Directorate of Intelligence at Headquarters, USAF, and many others that might be listed.

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It is evident that the course covers a great range of material. Because of its length (twenty-two weeks), the coverage is often extremely detailed. It is always intensive, carefully scheduled, and demands the full attention and activity of all concerned.

Some of the highlights of the most recent class, which I attended, may be of interest. Included in the curriculum was the Air Weapons Course, also conducted by the Air Command and Staff School. Instruction was given in U.S. and foreign atomic, biological, and chemical weaponeering. Students were permitted to see the different types of atomic bombs and study their manufacturing processes and employment.

A one-day trip was made to Fort Benning, Georgia, where demonstrations were conducted on infantry tactics and weapons, artillery fire, paratroop drops, and tactical air. The aircraft demonstration concluded with a plane breaking the sonic barrier over the heads of the spectators. Another field trip took in the Guided Missile Test Center, Eglin Air Force Base, Florida.

Typical of a number of fine guest presentations on specialized areas was that given by personnel of the Air Technical Intelligence Center on methods employed in estimating and evaluating Soviet aircraft, weapon, and other technical development. The U.S. intelligence story on [redacted] was used as one graphic example of the problems encountered and successes achieved in this kind of intelligence operation.

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Guest speakers invited to address the course were generally of a high caliber, representing many specialized areas of the military services as well as civilian institutions. They included: Maj. Gen. Sanford, Director of Intelligence, USAF; Sir John Slessor, Air Chief Marshal, RAF, until 1953; Dr. Stephan Possony, Georgetown University; Col. Jean H. Daugherty, D/I, Fifth Air Force, Korea; Mr. [redacted] CIA; Maj. Alexander De Seversky, former President, Republic Aviation, and prominent writer; Brig. Gen. James H. Walsh, D/I, Strategic Air Command; Mr. Gilbert Levy, Director, Counter-Intelligence Operations, FBI, during World War II; Dr. E. J. Carroll, OIR, Department of State, and others.

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AF VIEWS ON THE CIA

Opinions expressed by Air Force officer students and visiting Air Force speakers on the CIA may be summarized as follows. With few exceptions, all viewed the Agency as a necessary and valuable component of the

national intelligence structure. Much of this feeling of good will, however, seemed to stem from traditional conflict with the intelligence arms of the other services. Rather than surrender to G-2 or ONI on some particular intelligence issue, they would rather see the matter turned over to the CIA.

Criticism of CIA was expressed particularly in the realm of covert operations. One lecturer, a Col. Henry O. Fraad, brought down from Washington to speak on covert intelligence, made numerous slighting remarks about CIA's covert efforts. The Air Force, he argued, should be allowed to undertake covert operations where it felt peculiarly qualified to do so and where the information sought was of particular relevance to the Air Force mission. The same argument was often used in connection with many other CIA collection, and even production, activities which had any bearing on AF requirements.

Another speaker, Col. Daugherty, former D/I, Fifth AF, Korea, reviewed at some length what he termed the tragic mishandling of covert operations by the CIA and others during the Korean war. Prisoners controlled by one U.S. intelligence organization, he declared, were stolen by a rival group. Korean agents from different organizations were sent out on similar missions and occasionally captured one another. One result of such conflict and lack of centralized direction was that escape and evasion organization was never effective and friendly airmen remained in enemy hands.

The Air Force, Col. Daugherty stated, supported the view that all covert operations in that theater be placed under the control of the CIA. This responsibility CIA never assumed. Instead, a committee, C.C.R.A.K., was established on which representatives of the various intelligence organizations in the Far East theater sat. Operating as a coordinating body, it failed, he believed, to achieve the results desired.

The sum of such remarks directed toward CIA, created a rather unfavorable impression of certain Agency activities. A significant number of the student body who in responsible positions overseas had acquired some familiarity with our operations, readily accepted the views as presented. While personal relations between the Air Force people and myself were in no way affected, security restrictions as well as personal ignorance of this side of the Agency mission rendered any counter-argument difficult.

To date, it has been the practice of Mr. [] of our organization to deliver a general lecture on the mission and organization of the CIA before each class of the Intelligence Staff Officer Course. Because of the important place held by the course in the Air Force intelligence picture, however, and in the spirit of improved working relations between Air Force and CIA, some more detailed clarification of CIA operations before future classes would seem worthy of consideration. The "need to know" is of course a limiting factor. But much information, particularly that relating to requirements placed on the CIA by the Air

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Force--e.g., escape and evasion intelligence--might well be presented. Indeed much is already known.

The value of the Intelligence Staff Officer Course to the CIA participant is not easily measured. This report necessarily is but a brief account of some of the intelligence areas surveyed and problems encountered. In final judgment, both from the point of view of cost and time spent, the training offered seems eminently worthwhile.



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